supplementary deck · built from jagan's extended sessions
the deep dives
the class asked for more. this is the more: micro one level deeper, macro from the manager's chair, and game theory with the full toolkit.
Jagan Gopinathmentor · business economics
part 1 · micro, one level deeper
how much, exactly, does demand bend?
elasticity of demand
the law of demand gives direction. elasticity gives size.
price up, quantity demanded down, ceteris paribus: that much you know. the real business question is sensitivity: by how much does quantity move when the price does?
what sets elasticity
five forces behind the bend
substitutesthe closer the alternative, the faster they leave
time horizondemand stiffens in the short run, bends in the long run
product categorystaples behave differently from indulgences
necessity vs luxuryyou need salt. you want the multiplex
share of the budgeta ₹2 matchbox hike is invisible. a ₹2 lakh fee hike is not
the measure
one ratio, three zones
%ΔQ ÷ %ΔP
less than 1 · inelasticquantity barely flinches when price moves
more than 1 · elasticquantity moves more than the price did
exactly 1 · unit elasticthey move in lockstep
elasticity × revenue
the takeaway for an owner
revenue = price × quantity. when price rises and quantity falls, the winner depends entirely on which side of 1 you sit.
inelastic productraise the price: quantity falls less than price rose. revenue climbs.
elastic productraise the price: quantity collapses faster than price rose. revenue falls.
know which side your product is on before you touch the price list.
elasticity of supply
how fast can sellers respond?
cost steepnessif each extra unit costs much more to make, supply is inelastic
time horizonlonger horizon, more elastic: factories can be built, farms replanted
input-market demandsupply bends easier when the industry is a small buyer of its inputs
geographic scopethe narrower the market, the more elastic the supply into it
externalities
the bystander enters the math
buyers and sellers are not the only parties affected. social surplus = consumer surplus + producer surplus + bystander surplus.
negative externalitythe factory sells, the buyer buys, the neighbourhood breathes the smoke. a cost nobody in the transaction paid.
positive externalityyou get vaccinated for yourself. everyone you never infect benefits for free.
price discrimination, the mechanism
charge the inelastic more. charge the elastic less.
IMAX front rows vs recliners. the same drug priced for Africa and for Europe. the principle is elasticity wearing a price tag.
and the enemy of discrimination is arbitrage: ethanol sold cheap as fuel resurfaces as alcohol; drugs bought in Africa reappear in Europe. your recommendation to stop the leak?
market structures
the full spectrum, side by side
| perfect competition | monopolistic competition | oligopoly | duopoly | monopoly |
|---|
| firms | very many | many | few large | two dominant | one |
| product | identical | differentiated | differentiated | usually differentiated | no close substitute |
| pricing power | none. price taker | limited | significant | significant | high. price maker |
| entry barriers | very low | low | high | high | very high |
| examples | agri mandis, FX | McDonald's, Domino's | Apple, Samsung, OnePlus | Visa & Mastercard, Boeing & Airbus | KSEB, municipal water |
left to right: firms shrink in number, market power grows, competition weakens, and control over price passes from the market to the firm.
probing deeper
five questions worth arguing
structure
- is perfect competition even possible where fixed costs are huge?
- what happens to consumer surplus under a monopoly?
- why does monopolistic competition advertise so heavily?
strategy
- where is collusion most likely to emerge?
- where is mirroring the rival's every move, strategic interdependence, at its peak?
market failure
when the free market misallocates
markets work only when competition exists, property rights are defined, information is complete, and no external costs or benefits leak out. break any one condition and the market stops maximising social welfare. externalities are the biggest single source of failure.
two tricky goods
why nobody pays, and why everybody overuses
public goodsnon-rival and non-excludable: street lights, national defence, flood warnings. if you can enjoy it without paying, everyone waits for someone else to pay. the free rider problem.
common resourcesrival but non-excludable: fisheries, forests, groundwater. everyone maximises their own take, and the resource collapses for all. the tragedy of the commons.
information asymmetry
when one side knows more
adverse selection · before the dealthe used-car seller knows if it's a lemon. buyers price for the average, good cars exit, lemons take over the market. akerlof, 1970.
moral hazard · after the dealthe fully insured driver relaxes. the bank expecting a bailout takes the risk anyway. protection changes behaviour.
the policy toolkit
six ways governments push back
tax the negativecarbon taxes, cigarette duties
subsidise the positiveeducation, vaccination
regulate the monopolyelectricity tariffs cleared by independent commissions
police the oligopolyantitrust law, merger scrutiny
trade the pollutioncap emissions, let clean firms sell permits to dirty ones
force the disclosurenutrition labels, drug side effects, audited accounts. and polluter pays.
governments can fix market failure. governments can also fail: corruption, bureaucracy, poor information, political pressure. neither side of this page is automatically the hero.
part 2 · macro, from the manager's chair
what would you actually do?
six real decisions
macro is not a spectator subject
the flat-sales CEOGDP is expected to grow 8%. build another factory? hire more salespeople?
the cost squeezeyour inputs are up 12%. rivals haven't repriced. absorb or raise?
the ₹200cr loanRBI hikes repo by 1% the week before you sign. still proceed?
the infra windfall₹10 lakh crore announced. whose market cap jumps by friday?
the luxury puzzlesame management, brilliant years and terrible ones. why?
85 to 95the rupee slides ten points. name the winners and the losers.
the ₹500 crore question
which choice actually raises GDP?
buy shares of a listed company, build a new plant, or buy an existing factory. only one creates new production: GDP counts what gets made, not what changes hands. and yes, the software exported to a german client counts for india, not germany.
the harder follow-up: can GDP grow strongly while much of the country still struggles? hold that for the k-shaped case.
two thermometers
WPI vs CPI
WPI · the producer's fever
- measures wholesale and input prices
- the question: what does it cost to make this?
- watched for cost management and margins
CPI · the customer's fever
- measures consumer prices
- the question: can people afford this?
- watched for pricing strategy and demand
inflation walks through the org
one number, five worried teams
finance worries about borrowing costs. procurement about inputs. marketing about pricing. HR about wages. the CEO about the margin that survives all four.
the pricing-power test: at 5% inflation, who protects margin better, apple or a local phone brand? and why does the answer come from tuesday's elasticity class?
the repo dial, in motion
liquidity is a tap, not a switch
too much liquidityspending outruns supply
→
demand overheatsprices start climbing
→
inflationthe tap gets tightened
and in reverse: too little liquidity, spending slows, growth suffers. the repo rate is the RBI lending short-term to banks against government securities. the other dials: CRR, SLR, open market operations.
the ₹1,000 crore housing project
rates rise. now what?
the developer rethinks the launch, the loan, maybe the land bank. the buyer's EMI quietly grows and the booking gets postponed. and the automaker, whose customers buy on loans, prays for cheap money harder than almost anyone.
fiscal policy
the government's two levers
how much it collects, and how much it spends. push spending above collection and you get expansionary policy, and a fiscal deficit. contractionary is the reverse.
the argument worth having: is a deficit necessarily bad? borrowing to build highways is not the same as borrowing to pay salaries.
the business cycle
four seasons, four playbooks
GROWexpansionexpand markets, build capacity, hire ahead of demand
BRACEpeakcontrol costs, manage risk, shed excess leverage
SURVIVErecessionpreserve cash, keep customers, innovate cheap
POUNCErecoveryinvest strategically, capture share while rivals hesitate
cyclicals ride the wave: autos, real estate, luxury, travel, construction. defensives sleep through it: healthcare, staples, utilities.
the board question
₹1,000 crore approved. invest now, or wait six months?
the only wrong recommendation is one that ignores the weather. name the three macro readings yours hangs on.
part 3 · game theory, properly
what will they do, when you do what you're about to do?
why study games
strategy is interdependence
no firm acts in a vacuum: A's outcome depends on B's move, and B is thinking the same about A. and outcomes aren't only victories. sometimes the destination is cooperation, or a stable truce: live and let live.
iterated elimination · step 1
two firms, three moves each
B left
B centre
B right
A up
13, 3
1, 4
7, 3
A middle
4, 1
3, 3
6, 2
A down
−1, 9
2, 8
8, −1
payoffs as (A, B). start by hunting for a move that is always worse: will B ever play right? centre beats right in every row. eliminate it.
iterated elimination · the collapse
logic removes the moves one by one
B left
B centre
B right
A up
13, 3
1, 4
A middle
4, 1
3, 3
A down
right goes first. with right gone, down is dominated for A. with down gone, left is dominated for B. with left gone, up falls. one cell survives: (3, 3). equilibrium, reached by elimination alone.
the stag hunt
two hunters, one choice
hunt the stag together and split 6 units of meat. hunt hares alone and take 1 each. the stag cannot be caught alone: choosing it is a bet that the other hunter chose it too.
the stag hunt · payoffs
no dominated strategy this time
hunter 2: stag
hunter 2: hare
hunter 1: stag
3, 3the trusting equilibrium. best for both, fragile
0, 2you waited at the stag. they didn't come
hunter 1: hare
2, 0same betrayal, mirrored
1, 1the safe equilibrium. nobody risked, nobody gained
elimination cannot solve this: nothing is strictly dominated. two stable outcomes exist, and trust decides which one you live in.
nash equilibrium
stable is not the same as good
a nash equilibrium is a set of strategies where no player gains by changing theirs alone. stag-stag and hare-hare are both nash equilibria. so is both suspects confessing. stability tells you where things settle, not whether you should be happy about it.
the close
every price war, cartel and truce you will ever see is one of these grids.
rerun the netflix vs amazon matrix from the main deck with today's eyes: name the equilibrium, and name what it would take to move it.